Developing the Civil Law of Incorporeal Things by Bethencourt, Ricardo & Masferrer, Aniceto
Journal of Civil Law Studies 
Volume 12 
Number 1 2019 Article 4 
10-9-2019 
Developing the Civil Law of Incorporeal Things 
Ricardo Bethencourt 
Aniceto Masferrer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls 
 Part of the Civil Law Commons 
Repository Citation 
Ricardo Bethencourt and Aniceto Masferrer, Developing the Civil Law of Incorporeal Things, 12 J. Civ. L. 
Stud. (2019) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/jcls/vol12/iss1/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Law Studies by an authorized editor of LSU Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact kreed25@lsu.edu. 
 
 
DEVELOPING THE CIVIL LAW OF INCORPOREAL THINGS 
Ricardo Bethencourt,∗ Aniceto Masferrer† 
I. Introduction ............................................................................... 55 
II. The Roman Law Legacy .......................................................... 57 
III. The “Idea” Here is Not the Idea of Judge Learned Hand ....... 60 
A. Nature of Intellectual Property ............................................. 61 
B. The Fictional Existence of Ideas: The Juridical Thing ........ 63 
C. Reason for Fictions .............................................................. 67 
IV. The Notion of Use .................................................................. 70 
V. Use of Intellectual Property ..................................................... 72 
VI. Practical Applications of the Juridical Thing ......................... 74 
A. As with Legal Entities .......................................................... 74 
B. One Same Formula in the Civil Code for All Kinds of 
Property Rights .................................................................... 76 
C. The “Licensed, Not Sold” Exception to the First Sale 
Doctrine on Computer Programs is Implied with the Juridical 
Thing .................................................................................... 77 
D. Law School Curricula ........................................................ 78 
E. Arbitration, Mediation, and Alternative Dispute 
Resolution ........................................................................... 79 
VII. Ideas and Rights .................................................................... 79 
A. Unlike Legal Rights, Ideas Need Not to Be Classified as 
Movables and Immovables .................................................. 79 
B. Ideas Warrant Expiration; Rights Do Not ...................... 81 
C. Ideas Do Not Warrant the Distinction Between Pledge and 
Antichresis (and Mortgages), Whereas Rights Do............... 82 
VIII. Prospects of a Legal Update................................................. 83 
 
 
 ∗   Ph.D., Institute for Social, Political and Legal Studies, Valencia (Spain). 
 †   Professor of Legal History and Comparative Law, University of Valencia 
(Spain). 
54 JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES [Vol. 12 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 This article offers the legal profession a method to effectuate on 
behalf of authors, designers, or inventors who are residents of Lou-
isiana (or for Louisiana transactions) the rights recognized by fed-
eral law on intellectual property (IP) and unfair competition by ac-
tivating the civil law on incorporeal things. Additionally, it offers a 
way to enhance the civil law practitioners’ stock of solutions with 
the regular notions of property, contracts, and torts in IP and unfair 
competition law for fascinating results. Also, it enables civil law ac-
ademia to teach IP and unfair competition law through regular 
courses such as property, contracts, and torts and cease to label 
them as special or sui generis fields of the law. 
 With the adoption of the legal fiction of the juridical thing, the 
legal notions and solutions of the Louisiana Civil Code become 
readily available for the practitioner who may handle cases in a 
more competitive way. If one removes the words “right of” from the 
Louisiana Civil Code article 461 by replacing it with “things con-
sisting,” this subtle but significant change would make the point: 
“Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are comprehended 
by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes, 
obligations, and things consisting of intellectual property.”1 
 Very importantly, the juridical thing creates wealth in the indi-
viduals and activates private economy for an economic development 
that grows bottom up. The individual becomes aware of possessing 
a tradeable asset in a cooking recipe, a sales procedure, a builder’s 
drawing, or a tailor’s design. It creates wealth like other legal fig-
ures did in history; for example, “property” allowed individuals to 
own land simultaneously with the king; “mortgage” gave many the 
ability to own property where cash flow was lacking; and “wills” 
allowed the continuation (and distribution) of property beyond the 
life of the property owner. Also, “consensual contracts” permitted 
the outburst of massive business transactions in Rome and “security 
interests” made possible the overwhelming trade that arose from the 
recently discovered Americas.  
 Last but not least, by intelligently understanding the correlation 
between common law and civil law notions relating to IP, we secure 
 
 1.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 461 (2019) (alteration added). 
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the success of international treaties and prevent misunderstandings 
that lead to frustration and conflicts among nations, many of whom 
have so often felt unfairly treated.  
 
Keywords: Roman law, civil law, comparative legal history, incor-
poreal goods, intangible goods, intellectual property, software, li-
cense agreements, franchises, good will agreements, trade, secrets 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Intellectual property (IP) law has been highly developed in the 
common law in a manner consistent with its substance and proce-
dure. Yet, a comparable development is missing in the civil law, 
which has imported almost literally the common law on the matter.2 
The civilian practitioner has consequently come to label it a sui gen-
eris3—one of a kind—area of the law, without a consistent 
 
 2.  Thomas Nägele, Intellectual Property Protection in Germany and the 
EU, 5 WORLD COM. REV. 40 (2011): 
German intellectual property law is an aggregate of the Copyright Act 
(UrhG), Patent Act (PatG), Trademark Act (MarkenG), Utility Model 
Act (GebrMG) and Design Rights Act (GeschMG), flanked by some pro-
visions of the Civil Code (BGB) and the Act Against Unfair Competition 
(UWG); and the Federal Act on the Statute and Tasks of the Swiss Fed-
eral Institute of Intellectual Property (1995). 
Further, a review of the intellectual property laws of France (codified in 1992 in 
the CODE DE LA PROPRIÉTÉ INTELLECTUELLE, [C. PROP. INTEL.] [INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CODE]) and Switzerland shows that they are an aggregate of regula-
tions separate from their countries’ civil codes. These codes describe the general 
treatment of the matter by the civil law worldwide. The codes of France, Germany 
and Switzerland have been the model codes for countries in the world within the 
civil law tradition, and the latter have also framed their intellectual property laws 
as a collection of regulations separate from the civil code. For a survey on the 
laws in the world, see WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION (WIPO), 
https://perma.cc/4ZNK-L8BN. 
 3.  Moni Wekesa, ATPS, What is Sui Generis System of Intellectual Prop-
erty Protection? 3, Technopolicy Brief Series No. 13 (African Technology Policy 
Studies Network 2006): “In intellectual property rights discourse (IPRs) the term 
refers to a special form of protection regime outside the known framework;” see 
also John M. Griem Jr., Against a Sui Generis System of Intellectual Property for 
Computer Software, 22 HOFSTRA L. REV. 145, 148 (1993) (describing sui generis 
as “a new statutory framework . . . specifically tailored . . . .”). 
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understanding of it.4 Such a mechanism backfires on all, common 
law and civil law parties alike, a misunderstanding of the: 
 
 4.  For example, a common law “License Agreement” is frequently im-
ported to civil law as a “License Contract.” Such translation is a contradiction in 
terms because in civil law an act will be either a contract or a license but not both. 
See ELOY MADURO-LUYANDO, CURSO DE OBLIGACIONES § 815 (Universidad Ca-
tólica Andrés Bello 1967); see also “Contrato” and “Licencia,” in GUILLERMO 
CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL (Heliasta 1976) 
[hereinafter DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL]. A reason for such a translation 
is consistent with Schlesinger’ s finding of the legal principle of the “supremacy 
of the will” (codified in the 19th century); this principle has made almost every 
agreement or promise a transaction enforceable as a contract. RUDOLPH SCHLE-
SINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 279, 660 (Foundation Press 1988). Further-
more, the common law notion of “property” includes (apart from things) rights 
other than the fee simple absolute, which is by and far the main meaning of prop-
erty in civil law. See Yun-chien Chang & Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis 
of Civil versus Common Law Property, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 1 (2012): 
“Common law and civil law property appear to be quite different, with the former 
emphasizing pieces of ownership called estates and the latter focusing on holistic 
ownership.” See also RENÉ DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEM-
PORAINS § 312 (Aguilar trans., Dalloz 1973) [hereinafter DAVID, LES GRANDS 
SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS]: “The English jurist has a hard time con-
ceiving [the Civil Law’ s] ownership rules and does not understand why we cannot 
support a combination [of rights].” Compare the Common Law property rights 
(fee simple absolute, fee defeasible, fee tail, life estate) with the following German 
provisions: 
(2) A contract by which one party agrees to transfer his future property 
or a fraction of his future property or to charge it with a usufruct is void 
. . . . (4) A contract relating to the estate of a third party who is still living 
is void. The same applies to a contract relating to a compulsory portion 
or a legacy from the estate of a third party who is still living . . . . 
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 311b. See also Thomas 
Dreier, How Much ‘Property’ is there in intellectual property? The German Civil 
Law Perspective, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 
116-117 (Helena Howe & Jonathan Griffiths eds., Cambridge U. Press 2013) 
[hereinafter CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW]. So, 
when the term “property” is imported without qualifications from the common 
law, the civilian counterpart may wrongly assume it is an absolute right when, in 
fact, it may be nothing more than a for-term lease or a revocable license. Finally, 
the common law term “patents” introduced as property, turns out to be misleading 
in civil law, because for the civil law a patent is a title to a right (Título, DIC-
CIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL, supra) and transactions including rights over 
rights are not permissible. While this may not be a hurdle for the common law 
attorney, the civilian attorney is compelled to ascertain the patent subject matter 
(an invention, a process or a model) and not the “patent” in a transaction. See 
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (Fr.), art. 516; BGB (Ger.), art. 90. The Bello 
Code is an exception to the general rule prohibiting rights over rights but only in 
a limited way (CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] (Chile), art. 565). René 
David explains that: 
To translate ‘legal rule’ to norme juridique is not exactly appropriate; it 
is a wrong translation of the true nature of the [Common Law] ‘legal 
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. . . subtlety and complexity of the differences between the 
two legal traditions . . . . can affect all forms and phases of 
international dealings . . . . They get in the way of interna-
tional negotiations . . . . They cripple foreign aid programs 
[,] . . . . limit the effectiveness of cultural exchange . . . . [,] 
misdirect effort and misallocate resources.5 
II. THE ROMAN LAW LEGACY 
 Roman law serves as the basis for articulating common law and civil 
law, and also as a means to articulate both IP and unfair competition law 
within each of these legal traditions.6 However, two caveats are perti-
nent. Civil law is not Roman law, and Roman law is not the expression 
of the political organization of the Roman Empire. A first impression 
may lead the reader to equate civil law with Roman law. The reason lies 
in that civil law has indeed adopted Roman legal principles and solutions 
and made them its own. Nevertheless, it has not adopted the Roman rules 
entirely or unqualifiedly7 and its method for finding and applying the 
law is foreign to the Roman legal practice (which English common law 
 
rule.’ From the [Common Law] perspective, the French legal rule is ra-
ther in the rank of a legal principle; it considers the French legal rule 
more as a moral precept than a true legal rule. The [Common Law] legal 
rule for us instead looks more like a specific application by the judge of 
a legal rule. 
DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra, at § 321. See 
also Alvaro D’Ors: “The English, since the end of the Middle Ages, call legisla-
tion ‘statutes,’ while Europeans call local law ‘statuta.’” ALVARO D’ORS, ELE-
MENTOS DE DERECHO PRIVADO ROMANO § 4 (EUNSA 1991); the list of examples 
may go on and on. 
 5.  JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW 
TRADITION 151 (3d ed., Stanford U. Press 2007). 
 6.  See PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN 
CIVIL LAW (Hambledon Press 1988); see also MICHAEL H. HOEFLICH, ROMAN 
AND CIVIL LAW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 
IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY (U. of Georgia Press 1997); D’Ors, supra note 4; 
ANDRÉS BELLO, DERECHO ROMANO (La Casa de Bello 1959); FRITZ SCHULZ, 
CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW (Clarendon Press 1951). 
 7.  “[N]o Civil Law country has ever received the entire body of the Roman 
Law. Modern codes have discarded obsolete doctrines, rules, and institutions and 
have introduced new rules based on indigenous ideas.” JACK DAVIES & ROBERT 
P. LAWRY, INSTITUTIONS AND METHODS OF THE LAW 172 (West 1982) (quoting 
ATHANASSIOS NICHOLAS YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 38 
(Claitor’ s 1971)). 
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resembles instead).8 The method of civil law finds the law in legal 
principles, which are applied in a mathematical way to the case,9 
while Roman law finds the law after the analogical analysis of the 
cases and offers it to the decision-maker (or praetor) as opinions.10 
 On the other hand, Roman law is not the expression of the polit-
ical organization of the Empire.11 Roman law was instead the out-
come of a private professional development carried out during a 
continuous period of some 300 years (150 BC–150 AD) sharing in 
both the republican and imperial periods of Rome by people like the 
Scaevola generations (133 BC–95 BC), Labeo (30 BC), Papinianus, 
Paulus, and Julian (100 AD) among many others.12 It was a quiet and 
relatively far reduced number of people in contact with the praetors and 
authorities reflecting a superior spirit and invisible authority.13 
 The development of Roman law was a unique event in history, and it 
was followed by the work of the glossators in the 11th and 12th centuries 
of our era, the commentators in the 14th century and much later the na-
tional codification movement of the 19th century.14  
 Here is what Roman law suggests to the civil law today on this point: 
Idea est ens per se!, meaning that “the idea is a self-existing thing”—a 
thing. The reason to claim ideas as things (i.e., self-existing things) 
 
 8.  See DAVIES & LAWRY, supra note 7 (quoting Athanassios Nicholas 
Yiannopoulos):  
In contrast to modern civil law, common law is basically case law, as 
Roman Law was; the development of equity jurisdiction in England had 
a counterpart in Rome; and both common law and Roman Law are char-
acterized by adherence to tradition, strong individualism, the practical 
approach, and by the absence of a separate body of commercial law. 
See also “England has a peculiar legal tradition which is distinct from the Roman-
istic of Europe, although [England] turns out to be more faithful to the procedures 
of the Roman jurists.” D’ORS, supra note 4, at § 4. 
 9.  See STEIN, supra note 6, at 37. 
 10.  Id. at 37-41; JAMES HADLEY, INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW IN TWELVE 
ACADEMICAL LECTURES 77 et seq. (Forgoten Books Publ’ g 2012). 
 11.  HADLEY, supra note 10, at 51 et seq. 
 12.  See D’ORS, supra note 4, at 58. 
 13.  See LUIS LEGAZ Y LACAMBRA, FILOSOFÍA DEL DERECHO 439 (Bosch 
1979); D’ORS, supra note 4, at 99. 
14 Ricardo Bethencourt, Knowing Justice for Sure, in fine, https://perma.cc 
/9ZKN-MFNV.  
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lies in the mechanics of Roman law, which rests on the notion of 
things.15 Roman law and its textbooks make this evident.16 
 In contrast, the mechanics of the common law rest upon the duties or 
actions of individuals rather than on things,17 as does the civil law, alt-
hough to a different extent.18 It is from there that terms arise in common 
 
 15.  “The law, strictly conceived [and as compared to public law or moral, 
political, economic, sociological or other perspectives of the law], seeks an order 
in property,” that is, “among people towards benefiting from the possession and 
use of things.” ALVARO D’ORS, UNA INTRODUCCIÓN AL ESTUDIO DEL DERECHO § 
39 (Rialp 1989) (alteration added). “The role of [the law] is to ‘point out’ the share 
of each individual: this ‘thing’ or such debt that belongs to x.” MICHEL VILLEY, 1 
PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT—DÉFINITIONS ET FINS DU DROIT § 54 (Dalloz 1975). See 
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II-II, Q. 58, art. 10; see also ARIS-
TOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk V. Were the subject matter of the roman law to 
involve matters other than things, such as social order and rulings of the Prince 
which are subject to change at will or by factors foreign to justice, the roman law 
could hardly had achieved its model role, one which has made law quantifiable 
and certain, a technique and a profession, as commonly recognized. See Andrés 
Bello, Inauguration Speech of the University of Chile (Sept. 17, 1843): 
Roman Law has no equal: some of its principles may be objected; but its 
method, logic and scientific system have made and preserved it superior 
to all other legal traditions; its texts are the masterpiece of legal style; its 
method is the geometry applied in all its rigor to moral thought. So, says 
L’ Herminier. 
 16.  THEODOR MOMMSEN & PAUL KRUEGER, CORPUS IURIS CIVILIS (Law-
book Exchange 2010); D’ORS, supra note 4; SCHULZ, supra note 6; BELLO, supra 
note 6; SAMUEL PARSONS SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW (Lawbook Exchange 2013). 
 17.  “[The Common Law’s] immediate concern is to reinstate peace . . . it 
appears as essentially a Public Law . . . arisen from procedure,” DAVID, LES 
GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra note 4, at § 14; See also id. 
§§ 274, 276, 295-6, 315. See VILLEY, supra note 15, at §§ 42, 54 in fine (altera-
tions added): 
[M]ost of our contemporaries [Civil Law and Common Law] confuse 
law and morality. You have been often explained that the law is a set of 
rules of conduct. The ‘legal proposition’ would be responsible for stating 
what acts are permitted or prohibited; to which we are ‘forced.’ The an-
cient science [Greek-Roman] of the relationships of the law is overshad-
owed by the [modern] science of behavior, which seems to come from 
Morals . . . . But . . . the role of a judgment or an article of our civil code 
is to ‘point out’ the share of each individual: this ‘thing’ or such debt that 
belongs to x. The law is to aim first to this ‘object,’ a relationship be-
tween citizens; and the primary function of a lawyer is to ‘measure’ its 
consistency. 
 18.  See DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra 
note 4, at §§ 13, 321: 
[In the Civil Law tradition] the rules are conceived as rules of conduct 
closely linked to concerns of justice and morals . . . . The rule of law [in 
the Civil Law], closely connected to moral theology . . . is a rule suscep-
tible to orient the conduct of the citizens in most cases . . . . 
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law, with French origins, like “license” (from the Latin, “to authorize”), 
“lease” (from the Latin, “to let go”), “easements” (from the old French, 
“to ease”), and “sale.” The Roman law instead will use terms like 
“loan” or commodatum (instead of license), “rent” or locatio con-
ductio (instead of lease), servitutes (instead of easements), and emp-
tio venditio (instead of sale). All these Roman terms relate directly 
to the disposition of the thing involved in the transaction.19 
III. THE “IDEA” HERE IS NOT THE IDEA OF JUDGE LEARNED HAND 
 In Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp.,20 Judge Learned Hand 
delivered an opinion, where two plays—the first for the stage and 
the second for the big-screen—had in common the idea of a mixed 
religious marriage between members of an Irish family and a Jewish 
family. The plaintiff sued that the film had copied the idea of the 
play. 
 As the idea in the film was expressed very differently than in the 
play, Judge Hand replied that although the parties shared the same 
idea—the idea of a mixed religious marriage—its “expression” by 
each party was very different and therefore was not an infringing 
copy. Consequently, Judge Hand distinguished the “idea” from its 
“expression” and determined that only a copy of the expression—
not of the idea—would constitute a violation of property (i.e., cop-
yright). This distinction is now a classic principle of law.   
 Because we propose here the use of the term “idea” as a thing 
that may be owned, running against a copyright axiom that says that 
 
 See also VILLEY, supra note 15, at §§ 42, 54. 
 19.  Rent involved locare, that is, “the very act of ‘placing—locare—’ the thing 
. . . in the Roman conception ‘rent’ was precisely this act of ‘locare.’” As for “the 
‘emptio venditio’ [sale] . . . the ‘emptor’ . . . takes for itself—emit—the thing 
purchased.” D’Ors, supra note 4, at § 499. Further, “‘iura praediorum or servi-
tutes’ are the names for certain realty rights which the owners of neighboring lots 
set voluntarily so that one lot—called servant lot—would ‘serve’ another lot—
called dominant lot—.” D’Ors, supra note 15, at § 190. For more such terms, see 
N. Stephan Kinsella, A Civil Law to Common Law Dictionary, 54 LA. L. REV. 
1265 (1994). 
 20.  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). 
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ideas are not things, it is necessary to qualify the term “idea” in this 
article. For Judge Hand, an idea is “too generalized an abstraction”21 
within copyright law, whereas “idea” as we mean it includes the 
very intellectual operation, such as sense perceptions, analogies, dis-
tinctions, and conclusions. These operations also include patents, 
trademarks, trade secrets, and every other intellectual property. The 
word “idea” in civil law would then become a term of art.22 
 It is necessary to have a particular word available for every form 
of intellectual property, so that IP rules may be consistent and appli-
cable to all such forms. It will also allow the existing rules on prop-
erty, torts, and contracts (sale, lease, agency, partnership, etc.) and 
guarantees (bonds, pledge, and mortgage) to apply to every IP and 
not just exceptionally to some of them (in which event, a general 
theory would become ineffectual). 
A. Nature of Intellectual Property 
 A reason for the lack of a consistent development of IP rules in 
the civil law may be found in the existential nature of the intangible 
property. For instance, under the intellectual framework of the civil 
law, the notion of technology does exist, but technology does not 
exist in and of itself. This principle can be analogized to color. The 
color “green” is not suspended by itself in a “mine of green,” and 
the color “blue” is not there by itself in a “quarry of blue.” The green 
color is always found in something else: the green in a plant or the 
green in a chemical solution; the blue in the sky or in the ocean.23 
 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  If at all, “idea” here shares more with the copyright term “original works 
of authorship.” We could use the term “work,” but we prefer “idea” because this 
word directly evokes an intellectual activity, while “work” can also refer to mate-
rial realities. 
 23.  ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS I.8, V.7, XI.8, XIV, 1; ARISTOTLE, THE CAT-
EGORIES passim; ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS A 3: 186 a 28-31. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, 
DE PRINCIPIIS NATURAE 1: 39 b 32-33 and 1: 39 a 1-4; see AQUINAS, supra note 
15, at I, Q. 3, art. 6; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES lib. 1 cap. 
23 and lib. 2 cap. 52; ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, DE ENTE ET ESSENTIA, cap. 5; see 
AQUINAS, supra note 15, at I, Q. 28. art. 1 and I, Q. 50, art. 1 et seq.; ST. THOMAS 
AQUINAS, DE SPIRITUALIBUS CREATURIS a. 1. JOSEPH DE TORRE, CHRISTIAN 
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 In descriptive manuals, or in devices built with the help of a 
manual, technology does exist (like “green” in a chemical solution) 
and that is why protective measures are taken for the use of such 
things. However, little does it take for the practitioner to find himself 
lost again in his or her efforts to segregate and individualize tech-
nology in manuals or devices. As soon as a technology is found pre-
sent in the device by which it is built or in the manual that describes 
it, it will also be simultaneously existing in as many devices or man-
uals as there may be later produced. How then could legal interests 
be controlled when so many samples are handed over from one party 
to another, or to a third party who is a total stranger to the inventor, 
or to even a multitude of users?  
 Likewise, technology is also intangibly present in individual 
people (like the color blue in a piece of cloth), such as when the 
individual learns it or invents it. In this case, the legal practitioner is 
also confronted by a similar situation. If I “individualize” the pres-
ence of a technology in Mr. Doe, who invented it, how then will I 
individualize it when Mr. Doe discloses it to Mr. Joe and Mr. Joe 
further discloses it to Mr. Roe? Technology is now present not in 
one individual or two, but in three. And, if the technology is filed 
with the Patent and Trademark Office and is available to the public 
at large, then such technology is no longer present in a restricted 
 
PHILOSOPHY 82 (Palabra 1985). TOMÁS ALVIRA, LUIS CLAVELL, & TOMAS ME-
LENDO, METAFÍSICA 53 et seq. (EUNSA 1982). ANTONIO MILLÁN PUELLES, LÉ-
XICO FILOSÓFICO 7 (Rialp 2002). Gaven Kerr, Aquinas: Metaphysics § 4, INTER-
NET ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, https://perma.cc/KWS7-CSBS. See also 
ETIENNE GILSON, BEING AND SOME PHILOSOPHERS (PIMS 1952); Kathrin 
Koslicki, Substance, Independence and Unity, in ARISTOTLE ON METHOD AND 
METAPHYSICS (Edward Feser ed., Palgrave MacMillam 2013); JOHN F. WIPPEL, 
THE METAPHYSICAL THOUGHT OF THOMAS AQUINAS—FROM FINITE BEING TO 
UNCREATED BEING 198 et seq. (CUA Press 2000). Thomas Rego, Materia, forma 
y privación en el opúsculo de “Principiis naturae” de Santo Tomás de Aquino, 
64 SAPIENTIA (2008), https://perma.cc/DLJ5-7YUN. For recent perspectives on 
the Aristotelian doctrine of accident, see PAUL SLOMKOWSKI, ARISTOTLE’ S TOP-
ICS 90–93 (BRILL 1997). On work opposing the substance-accident distinction, 
see Willard Van Orman Quine, On What There Is, REV. METAPHYSICS (1948) 
(allowing for the proposition that all reality is accidental); see also Saul A. Kripke, 
A Puzzle about Belief, in MEANING AND USE (Avishai Margalit ed., Reidel 1979) 
(allowing for the proposition that no reality is accidental). 
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circle of people (so as to arguably resort to a joint tenancy), but it is 
available to the public at large, a fact that alone excludes individual 
property.24 
 If technology is present “in” material things, and “in” individu-
als, and simultaneously in all of them at once, it is not possible to 
individualize it theoretically in one singular thing or person alone, 
and thus appropriate it. Nevertheless, because the law demands that 
technology be separately individualized to be appropriated, we find 
ourselves confronted by contradicting terms. First, there is a tech-
nology that cannot exist by itself and typically not in one thing alone. 
Second, there is a requirement for justice that demands that technol-
ogy does exist in such a way and that it belongs to someone. How, 
then, can this contradiction be reconciled, if ever? And because 
every other kind of intellectual property, such as copyright and 
trademark, consists of idea—as defined herein—they share in the 
same existential nature and same question. 
B. The Fictional Existence of Ideas: The Juridical Thing 
 Under the given premises, if we face a contradiction here, it is 
also true that these situations, rather than being unusual, are all the 
more frequent in the law. The legal solution that may be given to 
 
 24.  See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in THE 
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh eds., 
Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association 1905), https://perma.cc/PR8F-MHKL: 
By a universal law, indeed, whatever, whether fixed or movable, belongs 
to all men equally and in common, is the property for the moment of him 
who occupies it, but when he relinquishes the occupation, the property 
goes with it. Stable ownership is the gift of social law, and is given late 
in the progress of society. It would be curious then, if an idea, the fugitive 
fermentation of an individual brain, could, of natural right, be claimed in 
exclusive and stable property. If nature has made any one thing less sus-
ceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the action of the think-
ing power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess 
as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces 
itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot dispossess 
himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the less, 
because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea 
from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who 
lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me. 
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such contradiction consists of ignoring the natural reality—what 
is—and stressing instead the legal reality—what for. This then war-
rants a fiction: that objects having no existence of their own be 
treated as having one. Based on this fiction, we are able to say that 
technology will exist legally as if it had an independent existence; 
i.e., as if the color blue would stand alone in a department store or 
the color green in a mine of green, even if this is physically impos-
sible. We may now also come to speak of juridical things just as we 
speak of certain legal entities as “juridical persons,” which are enti-
ties also created by way of legal fiction. 
 Intangible property encompasses more than the sole legal rights 
prescribed in the codes. In this day and age, it also includes compa-
nies’ goodwill, business relationships, public figures’ celebrity, 
works of authorship, aesthetic works, architectural drawings, trade-
marks, technology, technical information, processes, and generally 
any idea with legal value. 
 The difficulty we find in treating intangible property as things 
comes not from the fact that they do not exist but, again, from the 
fact that they do not exist in and unto themselves. There can be no 
“goodwill” without a business owner, “business relationship” with-
out contractors, “fame” without a character, “idea” without an in-
ventor, author, or artist. The difficulty we find in taking these intan-
gible things as self-existing things is due simply to the fact that it is 
not (physically) possible. 
 We submit that for the law it is a general assumption that a thing 
must be a self-existing thing. This conclusion is elicited directly 
from the foundational notions of the law.25 Further, modern scholars 
explain that, from a legal perspective, things must be (i) individual, 
(ii) valuable, (iii) divisible, and (iv) licit.26 Scholars also have 
 
 25.  ARISTOTLE, supra note 15; AQUINAS, supra note 15, at I, Q. 28. art. X; 
MOMMSEN & KRUEGER, supra note 16; See VILLEY, supra note 15, at § 54; 
SCHULZ, supra note 6; D’ORS, supra note 15, at § 190; BELLO, supra note 6. See 
also discussion throughout notes 14-18 herein. 
 26.  GERT KUMMEROW, BIENES Y DERECHOS REALES 34 (Universidad Cen-
tral de Venezuela 1969) (quoting Biondo Biondi); MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITÉ 
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emphasized that among the Roman classic jurists, things are entities 
composed of matter, i.e., tangible things;27 this is because matter 
meets those conditions and are certainly self-existing. 
 However, currently, not only tangible things are valuable, also intan-
gible things are.28 Precisely because ideas have a surpassing value in 
 
ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL (F. Pichon 1904); ALAIN BÉNABENT & DENIS 
MAZEAUD, LES GRANDS ARTICLES DU CODE CIVIL Tit. I (Dalloz 2014); HENRI 
MAZEAUD, LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL (Montchrestien 1976); AMBROISE COLIN & 
HENRI CAPITANT, 4 COURS ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS (Librairie 
Dalloz 1942); LOUIS JOSSERAND, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL POSITIF FRANÇAIS (Sirey 
1939); JEAN DOMAT, 1 THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS NATURAL ORDER Tit. III (Little & 
Brown 1850); ROBERTO DE RUGGIERO, CARLO MAIORCA, & FULVIO MAROI, IS-
TITUZIONI DI DIRITTO CIVILE (Giuseppe Principato 1961); FRANCESCO MESSINEO, 
MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE (Giuffré 1965); ALBERTO LA 
ROCHE, II DERECHO CIVIL 26 (Impresora Nacional 1981); 6 INTERNATIONAL EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: PROPERTY AND TRUST Part 5 (Athanassios 
Nicholas Yiannopoulos ed., JCB Mohr Publisher 1994). 
 27.  Angel Cristóbal Montes, La “Res Extra Commercium” en el Derecho 
Romano, 32 REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO DE LA UNIVERSIDAD CEN-
TRAL DE VENEZUELA (1965). Montes denies further that the term thing in roman 
classic law could have included legal interests or intangible entities even though 
the justinian codification did so later. Contra Luis René Viso, Las cosas y los 
derechos reales en el Derecho Romano y en nuestra legislación, 40 REVISTA DE 
LA FACULTAD DE DERECHO, LA UNIVERSIDAD DEL ZULIA (1974). Yiannopoulos 
says that “in deference to the terminology of the Code, the word ‘things’ will 
apply narrowly to physical objects and rights having a pecuniary value, suscepti-
ble of appropriation, and broadly to physical objects in space regardless of their 
pecuniary value and their susceptibility of appropriation.” Athanassios Nicholas 
Yiannopoulos, Introduction to the Law of Things: Louisiana and Comparative 
Law, 22 LA. L. REV. 759 (1962), available at https://perma.cc/P5YN-UWVU. See 
also Pottage and Sherman describing that the term “res” or thing in roman law 
did not intend to require materiality or exclude intangibility but the “matter of 
concern” to the jurist. Alain Pottage & Brad Sherman, On the Prehistory of Intel-
lectual Property, in CONCEPTS OF PROPERTY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, 
supra note 4, at 14. 
27. A myriad of statements has been made to this effect. Let us quote two made 
more than 20 years ago. See ST. JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS § 32 (empha-
sis in original): 
Whereas at one time the decisive factor of production was the land, and 
later capital—understood as a total complex of the instruments of pro-
duction—today the decisive factor is increasingly man himself, that is, 
his knowledge, especially his scientific knowledge, his capacity for in-
terrelated and compact organization, as well as his ability to perceive the 
needs of others and to satisfy them. 
See also Philip J. Carroll, CEO of Shell Oil Corp., Address at the Conference on 
Owners and Contractors—improving Process and Performance (Nov. 15, 1994): 
For two centuries after the Industrial Revolution, the success corre-
sponded to those who owned or controlled natural resources or knew 
how to use them better. But in recent decades, we’ve been part of an 
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today’s economy, the emergence of them as substantive things—or just 
plainly as things—in the law is inevitable. The legal fiction we submit 
here solves the problem that its contingent existence poses to the 
law. Further, by distinguishing strict property interests from “moral” 
interests, the hurdles resulting from the legal commingling of the 
two may be overcome by the use of this legal fiction.29 Evidently, 
this fiction seems plain and simple—in fact, it is. 
 That the thing has to be self-existing and not contingent (for the 
law) is what is not explicitly said in the textbooks. This may certainly 
have been because there was no practical need, but now the need is 
compelling. The individual person is now an economic component 
of wealth. In addition, because a human being must not be the prop-
erty of another, an abstraction is mandated: to segregate intellectu-
ally from the individual what is inherently his or hers and is relevant 
economically: an idea. 
 This segregation (and materialization) is made plain in everyday 
transactions. Why not do the same in the law? It is possible, pro-
vided that the thing be a self-existing thing; and so, as a solution, we 
submit the fiction of the juridical thing. 
 
admirable transition to a knowledge economy . . . . We will have to move 
beyond corporate hierarchical structures, strongly centralized and super-
visory that worked so well in the past. We will have to reinvent our or-
ganizations so that we can ensure our success in the future. We must 
move the decisions to be located close to where the action takes place; 
this is where it belongs. We must encourage people to develop a sense 
of membership for its part of the work and our companies as a whole. 
We must give them the tools, especially information, to succeed in the 
new economy in which they are our main resource. 
 29.  United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 27 (2), Dec. 
10, 1948: “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material in-
terests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is 
the author.” On the discussion of property vs. moral rights, see MICHELE BOLDRIN 
& DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (Cambridge U. Press 
2008); Mike Masnick, If Intellectual Property Is Neither Intellectual, Nor Prop-
erty, What Is It? TECHDIRT (Mar. 6, 2008), https://perma.cc/4VSC-2YEQ; Rich-
ard A. Spinello, Intellectual Property Rights, 25 LIBR. HI-TECH. 12 (2007); 
Stephan Kinsella, Against Intellectual Property, 15 J. LIBERTARIAN STUD. 1 
(2001); and Beatriz Busaniche, ¿Por qué no hablamos de propiedad intelectual?, 
in Monopolios artificiales sobre bienes intangibles, Vialibre (2007), at 
https://perma.cc/MB3M-YCUQ.  
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C. Reason for Fictions 
 The juridical thing satisfies the intellectual effort to make ideas 
a legal asset while respecting their existential nature, without forcing 
a reduction of them to material objects.30 Yet, are legal fictions a 
simplistic and artificial resort to an otherwise insoluble issue? Are 
fictions a fictitious easy way out, which would not stand serious le-
gal professional practice? We answer in the negative: legal fictions 
are and have always been a true legal resource.31  
 
 30.  In an effort to claim legal protection for ideas as granted to material 
things, Prof. Carosone, for example, sought to materialize the idea in an electro-
chemical reaction. See Oscar Carosone, L’opera dell’ingegno, quale bene 
immateriale: una teoria controversa, 143 RIVISTA DI GIURISPRUDENZA ITALIANA 
387 et seq. (1991). Moreover, in an effort to overcome peripheral, exceptional and 
analogous forms of intellectual property and secure it the same legal standing than 
property in material things, Pottage and Sherman explain that the historical justi-
fication of property rights in material things are all the more evident with intel-
lectual property today. See Pottage & Sherman, supra note 27, at 28, in fine. 
 31.  JOSÉ PUIG BRUTAU, LA JURISPRUDENCIA COMO FUENTE DEL DERECHO 
159 et seq. (Bosch 1952): 
J. W. Jones points out that for people generally the legal fiction is gen-
erally the characteristic feature of the mental process most akin to the 
legal profession. This forms the basis for much of the criticisms to the 
legal profession. But, resorting to fictions is in fact part of legal mechan-
ics. Put in another way, the law may use fictions as a means but not as 
an end. Such a condition operates similarly with language where its sense 
or power of conveying meaning stems out from the use of fictions; espe-
cially with the metaphor. The law is like a metaphor at the service of 
justice. Law, as an order of rules, is not alien to reality, even though it 
may not be readily translatable to a reality apprehensible by the senses. 
Law does not affirm anything that relates to a given reality; it limits itself 
to establish the legal consequences that must adhere to a series of facts 
that are, indeed, existing. Fictions are of means and not of ends; that is, 
fictions never consist of results but rather in crediting results to facts 
which did not have such results credited to them in the first place; in this 
way, securing justice to the case. As Julius Stone puts it, it is not that 
restitution proceeds because there is a contract but rather that a contract 
is assumed because a restitution is appropriate. 
A valuable survey of legal fictions going back to roman law is found in PIERRE 
J.J. OLIVIER, LEGAL FICTIONS IN PRACTICE AND LEGAL SCIENCE (Rotterdam U. 
Press 1975). Also useful, is Louise Harmon, Falling Off the Vine: Legal Fictions 
and the Doctrine of Substituted Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 1 (1990). The classic 
defense of legal fictions remains with LON LUVOIS FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS 
(Stanford U. Press 1967). Earlier efforts to justify legal fictions include WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 43 (Clarendon Press 
1768); RUDOLF VON JHERING, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END (Isaac Husic trans., 
Boston Book Co. 1914); RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS 
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 Evidence that fictions are a valid resource for the law, in-
cludes the great number of fictions that exist in it. No one thinks 
of them as simplistic or tampered solutions. For example, the 
law has developed many fictions, like that of legal entities or 
quasi contracts. The latter establishes certain liabilities as if they 
had arisen from a contract where there is nothing more than a 
factual situation. Additional fictions consist of “constructive 
trust,” “adoption,” and the very assimilation in the civil law of 
certain things to legally become movable and/or immovable as-
sets.32  
 There are several rules that are born out of legal fictions. In 
fact, legal rules are not born solely out of common sense, plain 
evidence, or habits, but require ingenuity as well as thoughtful 
and creative intellectual activity. In developing intellectual 
property, fictions constitute a valid resource. René David ex-
presses that “[i]t has taken centuries of doctrinal effort to reach 
the formulas, which now seem so simple and obvious in our Civil 
Code.”33 
 Louisiana Civil Code article 3440 on the protection of precari-
ous possession can serve as an example. It reads: “Where there is a 
disturbance of possession, the possessory action is available to a pre-
carious possessor, such as a lessee or a depositary, against anyone 
except the person for whom he possesses.” This provision was 
 
AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUDEN DER ENTWICKLUNG (7th ed., Breitkopf & Har-
tel 1923); and PIERRE DE TOURTOULON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
LAW (Martha McC. Read trans., Macmillan 1922). For more on justifying legal 
fictions, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 41-45, 338-350 (Bren-
tano 1930); HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE 
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 25-26 (John 
Murray 1861); and Alf Ross, Legal Fictions, in LAW, REASON AND JUSTICE: ES-
SAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 217-231 (Graham Hughes ed., NYU Press 1969). 
 32.  E.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts. 470, 473, 475 (2019); CÓDIGO CIVIL [Ci-
vil Code] art. 259 (Puerto Rico). See Legal Fiction, BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 
(9th ed. 2009). For a review of fictions on modern history, see Maksymilian Del 
Mar, Introducing Fictions: Examples, Functions, Definitions and Evaluations, in 
LEGAL FICTIONS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (Del Mar & Twining eds., Springer 
2015). 
 33.  DAVID, LES GRANDS SYSTÈMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS, supra note 4, 
at § 70, in fine. 
2019] CIVIL LAW OF INCORPOREAL THINGS 69 
 
 
 
introduced by the 1982 revision of occupancy and possession. 
Though comment (a) says that it is new,34 this provision has a cor-
relation with the situation in which the praetor Quintus Publicius 
was engaged in 67 BC. Appearing before him was a citizen without 
the legally required two-year possession of a property, who had been 
evicted by a person who had possessed the property for a shorter 
time. The former had no title nor action against the latter, but clearly, 
the latter had less of a right. Should the latter party still prevail?  
 The Roman praetor had no legal recourse to allow the aggrieved 
citizen to claim relief. Since he was not a dominus, he needed to 
show that he had at least one other right over the property from 
which he had been evicted. Alternatively, he needed to demonstrate 
that he had a minimum of two years possession, which he did not 
have. Therefore, the praetor, not having any legal recourse availa-
ble, contrived a solution by granting this citizen: 
an action . . . the formula of which instructed the judge to 
pretend that the legal time required for the usucapio or ad-
verse possession [2 years] had elapsed . . . . Thus, the praetor 
managed to allow an action for whomsoever had received 
possession in good faith, but had lost it to a dispossessing 
party before the completion of the legal time for usucapio or 
adverse possession was achieved. The grieved citizen could 
avail himself of an action just as if he were a legitimate 
owner.35 
Justice was done. 
 So, when is legal fiction fake? First, when it is unnecessary, 
but also when it is disproportionate to the case.36 An example of 
an inadequate fiction is precisely the one in connection with the 
legal treatment of computer software. Is it necessary in civil law 
to equate computers to people or legal entities—here lies the 
 
 34.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3440 cmt. a (2019). 
 35.  D’ORS, supra note 4, at § 176. 
 36.  On questioning the admission of new legal fictions, see Peter J. Smith, 
New Legal Fictions, 95 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1435-1495 (2007). On vindicating le-
gal fictions from pejorative claims, see Frederick Schauer, Legal Fictions Revis-
ited (Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 29, 2011). On an 
evaluation of fictions on modern history, see Del Mar, supra note 32. 
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fiction—to treat computer programs under le droit d’auteur (cop-
yright)?  
IV. THE NOTION OF USE 
 Now, how are ideas used? We can wear, ride, or consume tangi-
bles. Yet, intangibles do not allow for this kind of use. Should the 
use or ius utendi of intangibles be denied? Should intellectual prop-
erty be limited to the right to dispose of and receive profits from it, 
i.e., the classic ius abutendi and ius fruendi, excluding the ius 
utendi?37 Certainly not. The nature of the property rights relating to 
intangibles we submit here is not one consisting of an exception—a 
sui generis property right—but an ordinary kind, one that includes 
all three iusus. The notion of use is not only about the physical oc-
cupation of a thing or any similar act involving a physical posses-
sion.38 The ius utendi, or right-to-use, has been identified tradition-
ally with the physical use of things. Yet, we believe that this reflects 
only the nature of the goods on which those uses have been exer-
cised for centuries—i.e., tangible goods—not the nature of the ius 
utendi or right-to-use. 
 
 37.  HENRI Y LEON MAZEAUD & JEAN MAZEAUD, DERECHO CIVIL IV—La 
evolución del derecho de propiedad y la propiedad de los bienes incorporales, 22-
29 (Ediciones Jurídicas Europa-América 1960). From another angle, Josserand 
sees three different characteristics in the right of property, namely: 1) the direct 
relationship between the legal interest and the property; 2) the full use of the prop-
erty; and 3) the exclusive or universal enforceability under the law. These three 
characteristics are also to be found in the ownership of intellectual property: the 
first because the right rests on the idea and not on a right to the idea (thereby 
producing an arguably uncertain property right), the second feature is realized for 
the aforesaid, and the third feature is fulfilled by way of public recordings. LOUIS 
JOSSERAND, CONFIGURATION DU DROIT DE PROPRIÉTÉ DANS L’ORDRE JURIDIQUE 
NOUVEAU 95 et seq. (Mélanges juridiques dédiés à M. le professeur Sugiyama 
1940). See also KUMMEROW, supra note 26, at 229-230. See Propiedad, CABA-
NELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL, supra note 4, at § 2. 
 38.  “‘Use’ is the application or employment of something.” BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (8th ed., West 2004) [hereinafter BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 2004]; 
see THOMAS PATRICK BURKE, THE CONCEPT OF JUSTICE: IS SOCIAL JUSTICE JUST? 
173 (Continuum 2011); see also PETER LINDSAY, CREATIVE INDIVIDUALISM: THE 
DEMOCRATIC VISION OF C. B. MACPHERSON 142 (SUNY Press 1996). 
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  In the past, the law has confronted historical changes such as these. 
When in the ancient world immovable things became assets subject to 
property, Romans developed the notions of ius abutendi, ius fruendi, 
and ius utendi.39 Also, when over 500 years ago, the exercise of the ius 
abutendi in a market economy could not be served with the ritual forms 
of earlier centuries, negotiable instruments and bankruptcy were intro-
duced.40 Thus, the word use, in itself, does not mean or implicate things 
or actions of a necessary tangible nature (such as possession, occupa-
tion, or seizure), and even tangible use involves different types of con-
tent because use relates mainly with actions we perform: 
[The] tangible use has legal consequences; and so the use of 
a jewel is to put it on and wear it, though one may lose it or 
expose it to theft; the use of a garment is to wear it and even-
tually take it off; while the use of edibles, is to obviously eat 
them, which means their extinction. Hence, (also) the classi-
fications of goods in consumable and non-consumable; and 
the existence of different rules for the usufruct of consuma-
ble or perishable things . . . .41 
 Use is a word denoting work, exercise, practice, or action. In 
other words, use indicates demeanor.42 In case law, the word use 
(with the same Latin root usus) includes “to execute or 
 
 39.  FRITZ SCHULZ, HISTORY OF ROMAN LEGAL SCIENCE (Clarendon Press 
1946). PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY (Cambridge U. Press 
1999). D’Ors, supra note 4. BELLO, supra note 6. 
 40.  Bill of Exchange, 3 ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA (Hugh Chisholm ed., 
Cambridge U. Press 1911). CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS 
TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 30 (Princeton U. 
Press 2009). Layton B. Register, The Dual System of Civil Law and Commercial 
Law, 61 U. PA. L. REV. 240, 245 (1913). Rafael Ernesto Bedoya Rivas, El Dere-
cho Mercantil y la Búsqueda Moderna de sus Orígenes 8-9 (U. de la Sabana 
2009). See Leon E. Trakman, From the Medieval Law Merchant to E-Merchant 
Law, 53 U. TORONTO L.J. 265-304 (2003). 
 41.  Uso, CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL 
(Heliasta 1976), meaning “f.” 
 42.  Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th Ed., West 2004). See also Use, 
BARRON’S LAW DICTIONARY (BARRON’S EDUC. SERIES 1984); Uso, CABANELLAS 
DE LAS CUEVAS, DICCIONARIO DE DERECHO USUAL (Heliasta, 1976). References 
to the very legal definition of the word “use” adopted by scholars—such as “use 
things for your convenience or to fulfill your needs,” or use as the “action or effect 
of using a thing,”—clearly reveal that “use” also denotes a human behavior, an 
action. 
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accomplish” a goal.43 Not surprisingly, the term “customary 
law” was coined after the word use, as customary law is the law 
established after people’s customs, conducts, and actions.44 
 A further illustration of the meaning of the word use as hu-
man behavior can to be found in the Latin term ius abutendi, 
which translates literally into “right-to-abuse,” which, in turn, is 
derived from the terms ab and usus. Such “abuse” is to be un-
derstood as the act of disposal and not as an excessive behavior. 
Prefixed with ab (meaning “away from” in Latin), abuse means 
alienation or separation of a thing from one’s usus or actions.45 
 Also, the word use has generated multiple meanings—pre-
sumably because it refers to a reality as basic as human ac-
tions—one of which is “time.” Thus, the term “make use of” (or 
“have no use of”) is defined by the Webster’s College Diction-
ary as “to have occasion to use.”46 Also, the Cambridge Ad-
vanced Learner’s Dictionary refers to use as “a period of time 
something is being used or can be used.”47 
V. USE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
 In this context, it seems plain to us that while ideas do not allow 
for a physical use, they allow for intangible use. What is this use 
like? Also, what type of acts do we exert over this property? The 
law describes this use with terms like “making, using, selling, offer-
ing for sale, . . . [and] importing”;48 also, reproducing, deriving, dis-
tributing, performing, displaying, transmitting,49 and “identifying 
 
 43.  Use, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed., West 1991), meaning “v.” 
 44.  Customary Law, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 2004, supra note 38. 
 45.  Id. at Abusus and Abuse. See also Abuse, WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTION-
ARY (Wiley 2004) [hereinafter WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY]. 
 46.  Id. at Use. 
 47.  See CAMBRIDGE ADVANCED LEARNER’S DICTIONARY (Cambridge U. 
Press 2015), https://perma.cc/35JH-JJ2Z.  
 48.  Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 154 a (2019). WIPO, Intellectual Property Hand-
book: Policy, Law and Use 17 (Switzerland 2008) [hereinafter Intellectual Prop-
erty Handbook], https://perma.cc/5QMH-8RAD. 
 49.  Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1976). Intellectual Property Handbook, 
supra note 48, at §§ 2.178 et seq. 
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and distinguishing.”50 All of these terms disclose the one common 
feature of reproduction.51 This is so because reproduction is the one 
act that transfers the possession of ideas; possession being a pivotal 
aspect of property law. 
 Consequently, we succinctly define the wide range of uses de-
scribed in three essential types of reproduction gathered by the case 
law52: exhibiting, copying, or applying;53 like in: (i) exhibiting a 
sculpture or a painting, or presenting a play; (ii) copying a script, a 
movie, a musical, literary work, a scientific report, a trademark, etc.; 
and (iii) applying a formula, a design, a computer software.   
 The specific use of ideas determines their kind. For example, the 
use of applied ideas is realized by their application in nature. This 
includes formulas, procedures, models, and the subject matter of pa-
tent law. Computer programs are interesting: their use is their appli-
cation; yet such application is exercised in the form of copying, 
which is the use proper to speculative ideas. They still qualify as an 
applied idea. However, because their copying does not pursue an 
intellectual appreciation, but a useful application within a computer.  
 Regarding speculative ideas, their use is realized not in their use-
ful application, but in their intellectual appreciation. Here, the acts 
legally relevant consist of copying that allow or restrict their intel-
lectual appreciation. Speculative ideas include the works of author-
ship and the subject matter of copyright law (excluding computer 
software).  
 We are left with a third category: incorporated speculative ideas, 
the usefulness of which is also realized in their appreciation (rather 
 
 50.  Cf. Intellectual Property Handbook, supra note 48, at §§ 2.318 et seq.; 
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (2012); UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADE-
MARK OFFICE (USPTO), https://perma.cc/A83M-2DVU.  
 51.  See Copyright Act, supra note 49. 
 52.  See Intellectual Property (IP) Policy, USPTO, https://perma.cc/F9Z3-
KQYB. See also Intellectual Property Handbook, supra note 48. 
 53.  Yet, and due to the fiction of the juridical thing, it is also possible that 
intangible assets be “occupied” or “possessed.” To this end, consider how the 
rules on deposit and sequestration in the Louisiana Civil Code are applicable to 
intellectual property once the juridical thing is suitably included.  
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than in their application), but they require a material support; exam-
ples of this are sculptures and paintings.   
 The objects produced by 3D copying are not incorporated spec-
ulative ideas but are the matter of possession and/or tangible prop-
erty rights. The intellectual property rights that arise from 3D copy-
ing are vested instead in the computer programs and/or designs (i.e., 
applied ideas), which produce the 3D objects. Making the distinc-
tion between the idea and the object containing the incorporated 
speculative ideas is irrelevant because these ideas exist only in these 
objects. These ideas cannot be reproduced in other objects and the 
reproduction rights will consist of the ability to exhibit them. They 
cannot be reproduced even by the author himself who will, at best, 
produce a new work of art, or an imitation, or a development thereof. 
 There is also the intangible use of the business goodwill, as we 
find it in franchise agreements; and the use of a character’s name or 
appearance. These assets are non-intellectual incorporeal property. 
Other uses of ideas include the very ability of perceiving or under-
standing them, and their logical and experimental verification. How-
ever, because these operations are personal to the individual, having 
no exposure towards third parties (unless otherwise exhibited, cop-
ied, or applied), such uses become legally irrelevant despite the rel-
evance these uses may have in fields like psychology or ethics. 
 Finally, intangible use involves overcoming the natural ten-
dency and centuries-long practice of identifying property rights with 
tangible things and coming instead to perceive property rights only 
in themselves—a rational abstraction—regardless of the thing to 
which it refers. Only then can intellectual property be fully under-
stood in the civil law. 
VI. PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE JURIDICAL THING 
A. As with Legal Entities 
 It should be noted now that there exists a construct available to 
a lawyer who would come to apply the notion of the juridical thing. 
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When the lawyer needs to affix the subject matter in transactions 
over intangible assets (such as a formula, a method, or a model) that 
is sold, encumbered, or donated, the lawyer can operate just as he or 
she does when operating with a legal entity.54 The lawyer knows 
that, in fact, the legal entity does not actually exist, but the lawyer 
also knows how to conceive or imagine it as if it did exist and to act 
accordingly.55 The same goes with the juridical thing. 
 With this common practice in mind, we can then truly speak of 
a sale (emptio venditio) or lease (locatio conductio) of technology, 
and categorize transactions involving technology with the well-
known nominate contracts. In this way, a host of solutions and pos-
sibilities hitherto not applied yet are made available to the civil law 
jurist. Without attempting to restrict transactions including intangi-
bles by application of legal formulas and rules for transactions over 
tangible assets, we may now also speak of a sale, lease, deposit, loan, 
mortgage, servitude, barter, rent, pledge, possession, and prescription 
over subject matter such as technology, computer programs (e.g., Adobe, 
Microsoft Office, Kaspersky Antivirus, etc.), trade secrets, trademarks 
(e.g., Coca-Cola, Mickey Mouse, Google, etc.), works of art and author-
ship (e.g., Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings, Rodgers and Hammerstein’s The 
Sound of Music, Picasso’s Guernica, etc.), and businesses’ goodwill 
(e.g., AT&T, Hilton, or American Express franchises). We can convert 
transactions in the following ways:  
- software license agreement into a computer disk sale agreement;56  
- joint research agreement into a limited partnership;  
- authorship development agreement into a rent of authorship;  
 
 54.  Although the legal entity is an acting agent and not a subject matter of 
transactions like the juridical thing is, the analogy works because what matters 
here is not the nature of either an entity or a thing, but the intellectual exercise of 
conceiving or imagining such fiction. 
 55.  These mechanics are also useful for distinguishing the intangible from 
the material that contains it, or the individual that conceives it. It allows under-
standing that the material or individual is not the IP subject matter, but the intan-
gible thing alone. Similarly, as with legal entities when someone represents it, the 
distinction between the legal entity and the representative is clear, and the latter 
is not taken as to be the legal entity itself at any time. 
 56.  See Annex A. 
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- confidentiality agreement into a mandate of confidentiality;  
- franchise agreement into a goodwill lease agreement.57  
 These conversions require a code revision to implement them 
properly. Therefore, we must bear in mind that awaiting such code revi-
sion and a rent remains restricted to realty, a “rent of authorship” is only 
a device to work with (and not a nominate contract enforceable as such 
by the courts). There is no rent of intangibles yet codified. Further, the 
prior list is not exhaustive and a “software loan agreement” may convert 
into a “lease” or “deposit”; and a “mandate of confidentiality” may con-
vert into a “promise” or “declaration,” or otherwise be deemed a “natural 
obligation.”  
B. One Same Formula in the Civil Code for All Kinds of Property 
Rights 
 The notion of juridical thing overcomes the stilted inclusion of 
intellectual property as an incorporeal right in the code. If we incor-
porate the notion of the juridical thing into Louisiana Civil Code 
article 448 and add the words “and intellectuals,” the article would 
read as follows: “Things are divided into common, public and pri-
vate; corporeals and incorporeals; and movables, immovables and 
intellectuals.”58 Note that intellectuals are distinguished from incor-
poreals, although intellectual things are also incorporeal.  
 Likewise, if one removes the words “right of” from article 461 
by replacing it with “things consisting,” it would read as follows: 
“Incorporeals are things that have no body, but are comprehended 
by the understanding, such as the rights of inheritance, servitudes, 
obligations, and things consisting of intellectual property.”59  
 Additionally, article 475 reads that, “[a]ll things, corporeal or 
incorporeal, that the law does not consider as immovable, are mov-
ables.” Thus, because the Code does not establish rights of intellec-
tual property as either movable or immovable, they shall be deemed 
 
 57.  See Annex B and C. 
 58.  Emphasis added. 
 59.  Emphasis added. 
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movable things. If we take the rights of intellectual property as the 
subject matter of property, then this classification is admissible. 
However, it is not if we take as subject matter—as we should—the 
very goods in themselves: the works of intellect. The reason being 
that this property is not composed of matter and does not occupy 
space; consequently, it is not subject to transportation or allocation 
(sculptures, paintings, and works of this genre are “incorporated” 
intellectual property that do not raise an exception). 
 Legal rights may be identified as movable or immovable things 
because their legal existence is essentially related to an individual or 
a corporeal thing that takes up space and is subject to movement. 
Intellectual things as juridical things instead exist by themselves and 
do not need this relationship to another entity. It is irrelevant to qual-
ify them as movables and immovables. 
 The Code could include the amendments above and additional 
ones may be suggested. First, however, we use the term “intellectual 
property” over the Code’s term “incorporeal property” because ob-
jective incorporeals (which are not of an intellectual nature)—to wit, 
“legal rights, obligations and actions”—are included in the Civil 
Code already in articles 461, 470, and 473. Also, because the legal 
implications derived from intellectual incorporeals are clearly dif-
ferent from those derived from objective incorporeals (movable and 
immovable incorporeals) as we will discuss in section VIII A. 
C. The “Licensed, Not Sold” Exception to the First Sale Doctrine 
on Computer Programs is Implied with the Juridical Thing 
 The juridical thing allows to clearly distinguish a computer pro-
gram from the medium containing it. In such a case, both properties 
coexist in one same tangible asset without confusing the rights that 
belong to each. An example of such a condition is reflected in a 
computer disk sale agreement provided here as Annex A. The sale 
of a disk will not imply the sale of the intellectual property rights of 
copying and distribution. 
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 There is no need to find the “licensed, not sold” exception to the 
first sale doctrine.60 In Bobbs-Merrill, the Supreme Court estab-
lished that copyright owner’s distribution rights were limited to the 
first sale of the copyrighted work and copyright owner could not 
restrict book owners to re-sell or otherwise dispose of the book. Un-
der this rule, a software transfer could be sold upon transferring the 
disk (or a medium that contained it) and the purchaser would be en-
titled to resell the software or medium at will. To prevent this, soft-
ware owners implemented the so-called End-User License Agree-
ments (EULA) to avoid the operation of a sale in these cases. Soft-
ware owners could do this based on the Copyright Act revision of 
1976 that provided for software license agreements.61 Again, the “li-
censed, not sold” exception to the first sale doctrine is served with 
the notion of the juridical thing because it allows from the start 
to distinguish medium from software and the rights to each (cor-
poreal and intellectual, respectively).  
 In this matter, curiously, the civil law in Europe is at odds 
with itself. This is because the European Court of Justice ig-
nored the distinction between the juridical thing and the medium 
and allowed the first purchaser of a disk to grant a subsequent 
purchaser the use of the computer program (a right an owner of 
a disk does not have by solely purchasing the disk) via the resale 
of the disk.62 
D. Law School Curricula 
 Typically, intellectual property is taught as a course separate 
from property law, but the juridical thing will allow the civilian 
 
 60.  Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908) codified in the Copy-
right Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 109. In this case, the defendant prevailed on his 
claim to rightfully put different prices on books priced for resale by plaintiff based 
on that the exclusive statutory right to “vend” applied only to the first sale of the 
copyrighted work. 
 61.  See Copyright Act, supra note 49, at § 117. 
 62.  Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’ l Corp., 2012 E.C.R. I-
0000. 
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to understand that intellectual property is not a sui generis law 
but one that stems from, and is part of, the regular notions of 
property. A separate or special course on intellectual property 
will take a close look at property law in that area just as, for 
example, a separate course on real estate does.  
E. Arbitration, Mediation, and Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 The fabulous stock of alternative solutions provided by Ro-
man law can be immediately applied in the private practice of 
the law. For example, rent of authorship can be agreed upon if 
jurisdiction is given to arbitration or mediation. Arbitration and 
mediation centers will expand their practice vigorously.  
VII. IDEAS AND RIGHTS 
A. Unlike Legal Rights, Ideas Need Not to Be Classified as Mova-
bles and Immovables 
 Had we adopted the term incorporeal things in the foregoing sec-
tions instead of intellectual things, we would have had to further 
distinguish those incorporeal things into objective and subjective 
things because ideas or intellectual things cannot be treated as mov-
ables and/or immovable things. Instead, rights not only can, but 
should be treated as such. Objective incorporeal things would in-
clude rights that refer to individuals (by law or contract), but are not 
originated with the individual, and subjective incorporeal things 
would include ideas that originate with the individual. 
 Rights include essentially relationships between a person and a 
thing, or between two or more persons in reference to a thing (cer-
tain or ascertainable).63 Rights always refer to something and it is 
this reference to something that gives the right its value and use. 
Other relationships would lack any legal interest if there were no 
 
 63.  D’ORS, supra note 15, at § 48. See VILLEY, supra note 15, at § 54. AQUI-
NAS, supra note 15. 
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property interest involved. For example, a family relationship (sib-
lings, in-laws, cousins, etc.) would not in itself (i.e., by the mere 
bond) have legal significance, except when a common ancestor dies, 
and a succession is opened. 
 Ideas are operations or productions of the mind (the etymology 
of term idea suggests the notion of an image or representation64) 
that, under the law, are useful and/or original in and of themselves. 
Ideas make no reference to anything else to exist and are not in a 
relationship other than with its author. The benefit that an idea yields 
derives from its own capacity to give an advantage or to allow a 
useful application. In this sense, one could say that an idea is more 
of a thing (at least legally) than a right or a bond because the idea 
does not require a thing different from it to have value or legal sig-
nificance. 
 The moment we categorize rights as things, they must be cate-
gorized as movables or immovables. Indeed, if a right relates to a 
movable, it would not make sense to treat it as an immovable, and 
vice versa. There should not be a taxonomic uncertainty regarding 
intellectual things. If intellectual property is neither movable nor im-
movable, this should be affirmed positively; otherwise, intellectual 
property will be mistaken for one or the other. Thus, the movable 
and immovable classification should not apply to intellectual prop-
erty, even though this classification has prevailed for every property 
throughout history. After all, never have immovable things been 
classified as fungible or non-fungible.65 
 
 64.  See the following meanings of Idea: WEBSTER’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY, 
supra note 45: “Form or appearance of a thing as opposed to its reality.” See also 
DICCIONARIO LATINO-ESPAÑOL (Spes 1950): “prototype.” LE PETIT LAROUSSE 
(Larousse 1998), at 1 : “Représentation abstraite d’un être . . . d’un objet.” 
 65.  See Yiannopoulos, supra note 27, at 756. 
The Louisiana Civil Codes have adopted this distinction only by impli-
cation. The word ‘fungibles’ occurs in the French Civil Code and in the 
French text of the Louisiana Civil Code in connection with compensa-
tion. In several other articles reference is made to fungibles by descrip-
tion rather than by use of this term. 
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If the legal character of ideas remained uncertain at this point 
or if ideas could simultaneously qualify as movables and immova-
bles, one same idea could be subject to contradicting privileged 
rights of creditors. A debtor’s intellectual property would not be en-
forceable by a creditor because it is a movable idea, but it could turn 
out to be enforceable by another creditor if an immovable. 
 Because the ideas are incorporeal and because they do not 
need to connect to something else to have legal significance, 
ideas should not be classified into movables and immovables. 
Having no physical matter, incorporeal things occupy no space 
and are not subject to motion. Rights, however, although they 
are also incorporeal, can give up legally the incorporeal status 
precisely because their legal value depends on another corporeal 
entity.  
 In time, we may also be able to hold and exercise rights 
relating to ideas (i.e., intangible property over intangible prop-
erty). In this example, we can see a further distinction between 
these two types of incorporeal things and their different legal 
effects: although rights over rights are generally dismissed by 
the law for good reasons,66 rights with respect to ideas are di-
rect and clear and so they may be allowed under the same ra-
tionale that denies rights over rights (i.e., a misleading treat-
ment of rights and exposure to forfeiting property). 
B. Ideas Warrant Expiration; Rights Do Not 
 Rights are not subject to expiration because, in most cases, 
they expire with the thing or the alienation of the thing to which 
they refer Ideas warrant extinctive prescription (cf. statutory 
limitation) or expiration because just as they do not make use 
of space, they are not subject to time and are imperishable. 
 
 66.  C. CIV., art. 516 (Fr.); BGB, art. 90 (Ger.); CÓD. CIV., art 565 (Chile) (the 
Code of Bello is an exception to the general rule prohibiting rights over rights, but 
it does not include intellectual things or other incorporeals as the goodwill of in-
dividuals or business entities, business relationships). 
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 It is legally unreasonable to grant perpetual existence to in-
tellectual property when this property has to be harmonized 
with the public interest on the dissemination of ideas, science, 
and culture. It is then necessary to point out limits to the legal 
existence of intellectual property. Something similar already 
happens with the acquisition of property by acquisitive pre-
scription (cf., adverse possession); and so, the uncertainty of 
the title for a property should not prevent a lawful holder of a 
property for twenty years or more to become its owner.67 
C. Ideas Do Not Warrant the Distinction Between Pledge and Anti-
chresis (and Mortgages), Whereas Rights Do 
The incorporeal nature of things (such that it does not make the 
use of time nor space essential to their existence) dismisses the clas-
sification of guarantees in either conventional pledge (if the subject 
property is moveable) or antichresis (if the subject property is im-
moveable). For intellectual property, there would be no essential 
distinction between pledge and antichresis; the guarantee can be es-
tablished with either name. 
 It is not just that intellectual property may be simultaneously 
subject to a pledge and/or a mortgage—like when specific legisla-
tion may establish an unconventional mortgage over a moveable 
thing or an unconventional pledge over an immovable—it is that the 
distinction between pledge and mortgage disappears altogether 
when it comes to establishing guaranties over ideas. This should not 
come as a surprise; something similar already occurs concerning 
corporeal property, when it is not necessary to distinguish in the 
sale, as in the lease, a residential from an agricultural lease.68 
 
 67.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 3486 (2019): “Ownership and other real rights 
in immovables may be acquired by the prescription of thirty years without the 
need of just title or possession in good faith.” 
 68.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2671 (2017): 
Depending on the agreed use of the leased thing, a lease is characterized 
as: residential, when the thing is to be occupied as a dwelling; agricul-
tural, when the thing is a predial estate that is to be used for agricultural 
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 Privileges may be enforced uniformly over intellectual property, 
together with movables and immovables. A legislative drafting will 
be able to provide for that in articles 3186–3189 of the Louisiana 
Civil Code (on the several kinds of privileges), combining movable, 
immovable and intellectual things indistinctly pursuant to the exe-
cution of privileged rights over them. 
VIII. PROSPECTS OF A LEGAL UPDATE 
 The present article seemingly appears to be challenged by the 
century-long debate69 resulting in the law denying rights over 
 
purposes; mineral, when the thing is to be used for the production of 
minerals; commercial, when the thing is to be used for business or com-
mercial purposes; or consumer, when the thing is a movable intended for 
the lessee’ s personal or familial use outside his trade or profession. This 
enumeration is not exclusive. 
When the thing is leased for more than one of the above or for other 
purposes, the dominant or more substantial purpose determines the type 
of lease for purposes of regulation. 
 69.  Since 1942, the debate has continued with notable scholars taking sides. 
Against admitting intangible things: Henri et Jean Mazeaud (France), André 
Rouast (France), Fernando Conesa (Spain), José Massaguer (Spain). Favorable to 
admitting intangible things: Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert (France), Louis 
Josserand (France), Friedrich Beier (Germany), Oscar Carosone (Italy) (although 
by assimilating ideas to an electrochemical component) and José Castán Tobeñas 
(Spain). Also, scholars Gert Kummerow and Luis René Viso (Venezuela). See 
RICARDO BETHENCOURT, COMPRENSIÓN DE LA PROPIEDAD INTELECTUAL, 37-63 
(Jurídica Venezolana 2005). The doctoral thesis of Juliana Gáfaro Barrera and 
Fanny Lucía Gómez Pryor (Colombia) includes a comprehensive survey of Latin 
America practitioners (although now in need of update) who are also favorable to 
admitting intangible things. See JULIANA GÁFARO BARRERA & FANNY LUCÍA GÓ-
MEZ PRYOR, PATENTE DE INVENCIÓN: UN DERECHO REAL DE PROPIEDAD (Pontifi-
cia Universidad Javeriana 1977). Although the law continues to reject a full in-
clusion and/or development of intangible things, the debate narrowed down 
throughout the years toward favoring their admission. Pedro Chaloupka (Argen-
tina) stated already in 1983 that: 
[t]here is an increasing trend in the world—for the time being reduced 
almost exclusively to scholars with still few legislative achievements—
of encompassing the legal treatment of both categories [works of author-
ship and patents & trademarks] in a unified universe . . . . To that end, 
the World Intellectual Property Organization . . . has carried out and pro-
posed Uniform Laws. 
PEDRO CHALOUPKA, 3 LA PROPIEDAD DE LAS IDEAS (Revista Derechos Intelec-
tuales, Astrea 1988). Pursuant thereto, the Intellectual Property Act of El Salva-
dor, already in 1996, moved forward and united these rights. The Puerto Rico 
Civil Code of 2013 has admitted intangible things broadly, although it does not 
specify which they are (see infra, note 76). The Louisiana Civil Code has admitted 
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intangible property.70 This is not the case. This important conclusion 
of the debate was directed to prevent the dilution of the direct object 
of a right by artificially introducing a right over the direct right in 
the thing like a “rent of a title” or a “lien in a mortgage.” However, 
this was at a time when intangible goods were limited to rights, ac-
tions and legal interests, and did not include ideas; ideas are now the 
direct object of property. 
 However, under the same heading of intangible things, this 
article is an invitation to further debate, hopefully brief and this 
time aimed particularly at including new intangible things, 
which remain the direct object of property. The following fac-
tors should be considered in such a debate: 
1. That intangible things will now also include ideas and ab-
stractions (of the individuals’ skills and qualities), in ad-
dition to the subjective rights; 
2. That admitting ideas and abstractions will not implicate 
the risk of disguising the identity of the thing subject to 
property or a transaction (as with rights over rights in 
things); 
3. That the human factor plays today a preponderant role in 
the production of wealth as much as land and capital;71 
4. That the balance between the public and private interest 
has moved to a safe point of coexistence similar to the 
 
intangible things since its adoption in 1870 (art. 460 (1)) but converts them into 
corporeal for legal purposes (see infra, notes 76, 76); see also Yiannopoulos, su-
pra note 27, at 772. The Bello Code for Chile was the exception in the civil code-
drafting era of the 1800s and since 1857, it admitted incorporeal things, although 
limited to the kind of incorporeal things existing at the time (i.e., subjective 
rights). A definite conclusion of the efforts to fully develop intangible property is 
what this article achieves through the juridical thing. 
 70.  See infra, note 73. 
 71.  Darrell M. West, Technology and the Innovation Economy, BROOKINGS, 
Oct. 19, 2011, https://perma.cc/2DE3-GK3A; Carroll, supra note 28; ST. JOHN 
PAUL II, supra note 28, at 31-32. See also presentations at the Offshore Europe 
Conference at Aberdeen, U.K. (Society of Petroleum Engineers 1995) by (i) Rich-
ard L. Green, Partnering and Alliances: Theory and Practice; (ii) M. Straughen, 
Re-Engineering the alliances and Partnerships; and (iii) Susan Farrell & J. Ray 
McDermott, An international Perspective on Risk/Reward Contracting: Compar-
ison of U.S. Middle East and U.K. Alliances. 
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comparable coexistence in tangible things (e.g., the bal-
ance existing between private property and eminent do-
main); 
5. That intangible things are already admitted in practical life 
and implied in legal transactions; 
6. That there is a gap between the law and practice; and 
7. That the availability of clear and strong legal solutions 
will spur individual wealth and private enterprise. 
 The development of civil law may be accomplished by the 
sole implementation of the juridical thing. While awaiting leg-
islative change, attorneys and professionals trained in the civil 
law may come to instantly avail themselves with a host of new 
solutions already available in their code, empowering their prac-
tice of intellectual property and unfair competition. Nothing is 
more practical than a good theory, as John Delaney points out.72  
 Further, the legal professional will be enabled to assist and 
put into practice for authors, designers, or inventors who are res-
idents of Louisiana (or Louisiana transactions) the rights recog-
nized by the federal laws in connection with the civil law on 
property, contracts, and torts. Unlike other codes,73 the current 
 
 72.  JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING (J. Delaney Publ’g 
1989). 
 73.  Compare the relevant provisions of the Civil Codes of France (1804), 
and Germany (1900), which have modeled the civil codes worldwide: C. CIV., art. 
516 (Fr.): “All property is movable or immovable.” The code included intellectual 
property in 2015, but intellectual property continues to be treated as a legal right, 
and not as property. Prior to that, France had adopted, in 1992, the Code de la 
Propriété Intellectuelle but again, intellectual property was treated as a legal right, 
and not as a separate kind of thing. 
BGB, art. 90 (Ger.): “Only corporeal objects are things as defined by law.” 
For codes worldwide denying or restricting the inclusion of intangible things, see: 
CODE CIVIL [CC] [Civil Code] (Switz.) which classifies intellectual property as 
legal rights but not as a separate kind of incorporeal things. For provisions on 
traditional knowledge, see arts. 196(a) & 210(1bis); on competition, see arts. 
240(c), 340, 340(b) & 418(d); on inventions and designs, see art. 332; on copy-
rights, see arts. 380-393; and on trade secrets, see arts. 321(a)(4), 340, 418(d), 
697(2)(3), 803(1), 857(2). 
CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] [Civil Code] (It.), art. 810. Although incorporeal things may 
be implicit in art. 810: “Things that may become the object of rights are property” 
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Louisiana Civil Code explicitly includes incorporeal prop-
erty,74 but only to treat them further as corporeal movables75 
and immovables.76 The law then is called to develop its 
 
(Sono beni le cose che possono formare oggetto di diritti), the classification the 
Code later makes of things omits incorporeals entirely. 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Code] (Spain), art. 333: “All things which are or may 
be subject to appropriation are considered movable or immovable property.” 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [CÓD. CIV.] [Civil Code] (Arg.), arts. 2311-12; See GUILLERMO 
CABANELLAS DE LAS CUEVAS, RÉGIMEN JURÍDICO DE LOS CONOCIMIENTOS TÉCNI-
COS 274-5 (Heliasta 1984): 
The domain protected by the Civil Code and other relevant provisions 
apply to things or to material objects likely to have a value . . . . And so 
it is the case that the different rules related to the acquisition of owner-
ship lack generally any meaning if there’ s an attempt to apply them to 
intangible things. 
CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] [Civil Code] (Braz.), Book II, arts. 79 et seq., do not include 
the distinction between corporeal and incorporeal things; the latter are regulated 
by statutes other than the civil code and then as rights and not as property. 
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, (Can.), art. 899: “Property, whether corporeal 
or incorporeal, is divided into immovables and movables.” 
MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] (Jap.), art. 85: “The term ‘Things’ as used in this Code 
shall mean tangible thing.” 
 74.  LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 448 (2019): “Things are divided into common, 
public and private; corporeals, incorporeals; and movables and immovables.” 
 75.  Id. at art. 473. 
 76.  Id. at art. 470. See also art. 461 § 2: “Incorporeals are things that have no 
body, but are comprehended by the understanding, such as the rights of inher-
itance, servitudes, obligations, and right of intellectual property.” But because art. 
475 reads that “[a]ll things, corporeal or incorporeal, that the law does not con-
sider as immovable, are movables,” then all incorporeal things are legally treated 
as corporeal things. 
For codes admitting incorporeal things, see: 
The Civil Code of Chile operates similarly to the Louisiana Code. It explicitly 
includes incorporeal property but only to limit it to legal rights. CÓD. CIV., art. 
565: “Goods consist of corporeal or incorporeal things. Corporeal things are those 
having a true entity and may be perceived by the senses, like a house, a book. 
Incorporeal things consist of mere rights, such as rights of credit and active ease-
ments.” Art. 584: “The works of talent or wit belong to their authors. This kind of 
property is governed by separate statutes.” 
In Puerto Rico, the Civil Code is broader than either the Louisiana or Chile Codes 
because it includes incorporeal without limiting them to rights, although without 
specifying the goods falling into its category. It is an open provision, unique to 
this code and suited to include the juridical thing. CÓDIGO CIVIL [Civil Code], art. 
252 reads: “The term ‘property’ is generally applicable to anything that may con-
stitute wealth or fortune.” This term also relates simultaneously with the term 
“things” which constitutes the second object of the law, according to which the 
principles and rules thereof refer to people, things and actions. Further, art. 258 
reads: 
Things are also divided into corporeal and incorporeal. Those that are 
tangible are manifest to the senses, can be touched or tasted and have a 
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solutions over incorporeals to have a standing of their own 
and, further, to expand its scope (presently limited to rights, 
obligations, and actions) in order that it includes intellectual 
things and objective incorporeal things as well. 
 Incorporeals do not have a separate standing or section in 
the code. The development of such a provision, with all its 
implications, is yet to be done. Indeed, decades ago, Prof. 
Gert Kummerow pointed out that incorporeal property is one 
of “unsuspected legal applications.”77 And Professors Planiol 
and Ripert stated that “incorporeal properties are intended to 
achieve great development . . . .”78 
ANNEX A 
(Illustrating Section VI.C)  
COMPUTER DISK SALE AGREEMENT 
(for a Software License Agreement) 
 
When the owner licenses a computer program—as an intellectual 
thing—he is really not licensing the computer program but quite the 
opposite: the owner is denying intellectual property rights in it. The 
owner is only selling the disk, the tangible thing.   
  
In this context, the Computer Disk Sales can secure the intellectual 
property rights of the owner by providing a warning. Certainly, the 
prolific restrictions of the standard Software License Agreements 
can be included here. 
  
 
body, whether animate or inanimate. Of this kind of things are the fruits, 
cereals, gold, silver, clothing, furniture, land, pastures, woods, house, et-
cetera. Incorporeal things are those that are not manifest to the senses 
and whose existence is only conceived by the understanding, such as in-
heritance rights, easements and obligations. 
 77.  KUMMEROW, supra note 26, at 39. 
 78.  MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGES RIPERT, 3 TRAITÉ PRATIQUE DE DROIT CI-
VIL FRANÇAIS 489-510 (L.G.D.J. 1952). 
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CAVEAT 
 
The purchase of this disk does not convey intellectual property rights in its 
contents. The purchase is limited to the disk (incorporating the program) 
and the use and benefit obtained therefrom. 
 
Consequently, you are not authorized to reproduce or distribute in any 
way the computer software contained in this disk, except the right to make 
a backup or support copy of the software for your personal use and safety 
procedures. 
 
The violation of these provisions may result in the seizure of the disk and 
all other materials containing the illegal reproductions of the software, 
notwithstanding the prosecution of civil and criminal penalties under the 
law. 
  
Compare to a Software Lease Agreement: 
  
LEASE. OWNER hereby leases the computer programs identified 
above (“Software”) to LESSEE [anywhere] [the territory of . . . . ] 
[Industry or markets . . . .] for a royalty fee and under the terms 
contained hereunder. This is a lease of an intellectual property and 
as such it comprises the reproduction or copying of the Software. 
Updates and upgrades of Software shall be construed as leased here-
under and by the more specific terms provided for them in this 
agreement. The use of Software other than the use granted under this 
agreement shall require OWNER’s consent. 
 
ANNEX B 
(Illustrating Section VI.A)  
LEASE OF COMPANY’S GOODWILL (or Franchise Agreement) 
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COMPANY (referred to as Lessor) by this agreement leases to 
[name of lessee] (referred to as Lessee), the following described 
goodwill of COMPANY (“Goodwill”): 
  
1. GOODWILL. COMPANY leases its Goodwill to Lessee for the 
location, time, terms and conditions as provided hereunder. COM-
PANY’S Goodwill shall consist of its Market Value and/or Selling 
Capacity [Optional: specify the Market Value and/or Selling Capac-
ity].79 
2. Royalties/Fees/Rent. This lease is made for and in consideration 
of a royalty fee or rent of $ [dollar amount], payable [specification 
of frequency and terms of payment]. 
3. Ownership of Company’s System; Standards. 
4.  Lines of Supply; Customers; Confidentiality; Noncompetition. 
5. Use of patents, trademarks, copyrights. 
6.  Advertising. 
7.  Training; On-Line Systems Support Guide. 
8.  Lease of Equipment and Facilities. 
9.  Merchandising and Inventory; Recommended Vendors 
10. Term and Renewal. This lease is for the term of [specification of 
term] commencing on [date] and ending on [date]. 
11. Bookkeeping and Financial Matters. Audit Rights. 
12. Taxes. 
13. No Assignment or Subleases. 
14. Representations and Covenants. 
15. Indemnity. Insurance. 
16. Termination. 
17. Mediation. Governing Law. Jurisdiction. 
18. Miscellaneous Provisions. 
19. Surety. 
 
 
 79. Goodwill, Market Value, Selling Capacity, etc. are terms that describe the 
Objective Incorporeal thing in franchise agreements; i.e., the one true property 
being leased. 
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[Name of surety], who is a party to this contract of lease and is bound 
with Lessee IN SOLIDO for the faithful execution of all the obliga-
tions to be performed on the part of the Lessee, and furthermore 
waives all rights to a release from this obligation due to Lessor’s 
failure to protest for nonpayment of rent or due to granting of any 
extensions or indulgences to Lessee or any modifications of this 
lease, or due to the filing of a bankruptcy, receivership or respite 
petition by or against Lessee or discharge in bankruptcy of Lessee, 
or on Lessee’s suspension, failure or insolvency, or to the appoint-
ment of a receiver for Lessee by any competent court. 
  
This lease is made and signed in triplicate, in [name of city], Loui-
siana, on [date of lease].  
 
_____________ [Name of lessee] 
_____________ [Name of lessor] 
_____________ [Name of surety] 
 
When the notion of such an incorporeal is not in place, compare the 
otherwise lengthy descriptions practitioners make to get the point 
across (if they do). 
Statement of Intent80  
 (1) Franchising is a method of distributing goods or services in 
a consistent manner. The customer expects a similar shopping expe-
rience at a franchised business, regardless of its location or operator. 
By signing this Agreement, you acknowledge the importance of 
these concepts, and agree to participate in the 7-Eleven System, 
which promotes a uniform method of operating a convenience store. 
You recognize that a uniform presentation of a high quality 7-Eleven 
Image is critical to the customer’s perception of the 7-Eleven 
 
80 SEC filings, i.e. 7-Eleven, Inc., Individual Store Franchise Agreement, Exhibit 
10.(ii)(B)(1), at https://perma.cc/R8BQ-JGB5. 
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System, and that you agree to contribute to that perception by oper-
ating your Store in compliance with this Agreement and the 7-
Eleven System.                              
  (2) You recognize the benefits to you and the 7-Eleven System 
(including the benefits of scale that a large chain gets from its high 
volume of purchases) of purchasing the products and services sold 
at your Store from common vendors and/or distributors. You agree: 
(a) to operate your Store in a way that recognizes the right and re-
sponsibility of the retailer to provide value to 7-Eleven customers 
and (b) to order the products and services 7-Eleven customers want, 
introduce new products, manage frequent deliveries, discontinue of-
fering slow selling items, and provide excellent customer service.     
  (3) You agree that the 7-Eleven System is subject to modifica-
tion based on changes in technology, competitive circumstances, 
customer expectations, and other market variables. Those changes 
to the 7-Eleven System may include changes in operating standards, 
products, programs, services, methods, forms, policies and proce-
dures; changes in the design and appearance of the building, signage 
and equipment; and changes to the Service Mark and Related Trade-
marks.                                                                               
  (4) We agree to assist you by providing a recognized brand, mer-
chandising advice and operational systems designed to meet the 
needs of 7-Eleven customers. We also agree to contribute to the 
value of the 7-Eleven Service Mark and brand by fulfilling those 
duties and tasks assigned to us in this Agreement as our responsibil-
ity within the 7-Eleven System.     
  (5) You recognize the advantages of the 7-Eleven System and 
wish to obtain a franchise for a 7-Eleven Store. You understand that 
an investment in the Store involves business risks and that your busi-
ness abilities and efforts are vital to the success of the Store. You 
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agree that the terms of this Agreement are acceptable to you and are 
material and reasonable. 
ANNEX C 
(Illustrating Section VI.A)  
 
The following sample is an actual franchise which already makes 
the point of identifying the objective incorporeal thing—a concept 
and system (see first sentence)—without referring to the term 
“goodwill” (it doesn’t have to): 
LEASE OF COMPANY’S GOODWILL (or Franchise Agreement) 
1. The Franchise.81 We have the exclusive right to license and 
franchise a concept and system (the “Hotel System”) associated with 
the establishment and operation of hotels under the name “HY-
ATT® PLACE” and other Proprietary Marks (defined below) (col-
lectively, “Hyatt Place Hotels”). Before signing this Agreement, you 
read our Uniform Franchise Offering Circular and independently in-
vestigated and evaluated the risks of investing in the hotel industry 
generally and acquiring a Hyatt Place Hotel franchise specifically. 
Following your investigation and recognizing the benefits that you 
may derive from being identified with the Hotel System, you wish 
to enter into this Agreement to obtain a franchise to use the Hotel 
System to operate a Hyatt Place Hotel located at HOTELAD-
DRESS1, HOTELADDRESS2 (the “Hotel”). 
  
 A. The Hotel. The Hotel includes all structures, facilities, appur-
tenances, furniture, fixtures, equipment, entrances, exits, and park-
ing areas located on the real property identified on Attachment A or 
any other real property we approve for Hotel expansion, signage, or 
 
 81.  SEC filings, i.e. Form of Franchise Agreement, Franchise Agreement be-
tween Hyatt Place Franchising, LLC and Entity Name Caps, Exhibit 10.46, at 
https://perma.cc/5CAS-65V5. 
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other facilities. You may not make any material changes to the Ho-
tel’s existing or planned construction without our prior written con-
sent, including any change in the number of guest rooms at the Hotel 
(collectively “Guest Rooms”). 
  
 B. The Hotel System. We and our affiliates have designed the 
Hotel System so that the public associates Hyatt Place Hotels with 
high quality standards. The Hotel System now includes: (a) the trade 
names, trademarks, and service marks “Hyatt Place” and such other 
trade names, trademarks, service marks, logos, slogans, trade dress, 
domain names, and other designations of source and origin (includ-
ing all derivatives of the foregoing) that we periodically develop and 
designate for use in connection with the Hotel System (collectively, 
the “Proprietary Marks”); (b) all copyrightable materials that we pe-
riodically develop and designate for use in connection with the Hotel 
System, including the Manual (as defined below), videotapes, 
CDs/DVDs, marketing materials (including advertising, promo-
tional, and public relations materials), architectural drawings (in-
cluding all architectural plans, designs, and layouts such as, without 
limitation, site, floor, plumbing, lobby, electrical, and landscape 
plans), building designs, and business and marketing plans, whether 
or not registered with the U.S. Copyright Office (“Copyrighted Ma-
terials”); (c) all materials and other information that we designate as 
“confidential” orally or in writing or which, under the circumstances 
surrounding disclosure, ought to be treated as confidential, includ-
ing all operations information, confidential manuals, revenue infor-
mation, specifications, procedures, and business, marketing and 
other plans, as more fully identified in Section 5F of this Agreement 
(collectively, “Confidential Information”); (d) a national toll-free 
number for, and other aspects of, the central reservation system, as 
we renovate and modify it from time to time (“CRS”); (e) a global 
distribution system, as we renovate and modify it from time to time 
(“GDS”); (f) the national directory of Hyatt Place Hotels (which, at 
our option, also may be associated with any other hotel brand or 
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other business that we or our affiliates own, operate, franchise, li-
cense or manage) (the “National Directory”); (g) management, per-
sonnel, and operational training programs, materials, and proce-
dures; (h) standards, specifications, procedures, and rules for opera-
tions, marketing, construction, equipment, furnishings, and quality 
assurance (collectively, “System Standards”) described in our con-
fidential manuals, as amended from time to time (collectively, the 
“Manual”), or in other written or electronic communications; and (i) 
marketing, advertising, and promotional programs. Although we re-
tain the right to establish and periodically to modify System Stand-
ards for the Hotel that you agree to implement and maintain, and. to 
modify the Hotel System as we deem best for Hyatt Place Hotels, 
you retain the right to control, and responsibility for, the Hotel’s 
day-to-day management and operation and implementing and main-
taining System Standards at the Hotel. In addition, our mandatory 
System Standards do not include any personnel or security-related 
policies or procedures that we (at our option) make available to you 
in the Manual or otherwise for your optional use. You will determine 
to what extent, if any, these optional policies and procedures should 
apply to your Hotel’s operations. You acknowledge that we do not 
dictate or control labor or employment matters for franchisees and 
their employees and will not be responsible for the safety and secu-
rity of Hotel employees or patrons. 
 
